A scrollytelling essay on three freight markets

Shipping Is Not One Cycle

Alongside the container-shipping narrative — where are dry bulk and tanker shipping in their respective cycles?

Data through 2026-07-10 · anchor company: COSCO Shipping Holdings · every figure sourced on the page

• 38.7% — Container orderbook, % of fleet (2026-06)
• 7.0% — Dry-bulk orderbook, % of fleet (2026-06)
• 14.7% — Tanker orderbook, % of fleet (2025-09)

SCROLL▼

One industry, three clocks

No historical period explains all three subsectors at once: the container-shipping orderbook resembles 2007, dry bulk resembles the post-2016 period, and tankers are a new regime that emerged in 2022—the answer must be segmented by vessel type.

Same case: If the delivery wave coincides with the end of rerouting, container shipping enters a 2009–2016-style shakeout.

Different case: The dry bulk/tanker shipping orderbook is thin, and the prosperity is not determined by the container shipping clock.

Container shipping

Event-driven tightness (front-loaded orderbook)

SCFI 3,184.83

On the eve of margin pressure — Premium persists; delivery wave has not yet arrived. Event-driven tightness overlays a 38–39% orderbook with deliveries peaking in 2029.

Shanghai Shipping Exchange / Alphaliner, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: SCFI 3184 / CCFI 1873

Dry bulk

Early upcycle (tentative)

BDI 2,944

Early upcycle / renewed expansion — BDI +101%, earnings at a new high. A ~7% orderbook (multi-year low) meets rerouting-driven ton-miles.

akshare daily / Clarksons via Benzinga, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: BDI 2944(+101%)

Tanker shipping

Renewed expansion (tentative)

BDTI 2,031

Renewed expansion — earnings at a 19-month high and 2025 profits at a record; scrapping near zero while the fleet ages.

akshare daily / Riviera-Clarksons, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: BDTI 2031 / BCTI 1048

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI/CCFI website (2026-07-10)

+1 more sources

• SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%

· as of 2026-07-10 · answer box v2

Nineteen years of the anchor company: one listing at the peak, one near-death escape, and two event-driven windfalls

COSCO Shipping Holdings' share-price curve is a living chronology of the container-shipping cycle: listing at the 2007 peak, *ST designation in 2013, and two event-driven windfalls in 2021 and 2024/2026.

IPO price RMB 8.48 in 2007-06, reaching RMB 68.4 in month 10: the cycle peak was the ideal issuance window

Reorganization and name change from *ST in 2013 to 2016: The shakeout left its mark on both the share price and the financial statements

RMB 1.33 from the end of 2020 to ten times in 2021: leading freight rate, mid-range stock price, and trailing profit

01 / 07

Nineteen years in one line

The full forward-adjusted monthly curve, 2007-06 to 2026-07: one listing at the peak, one near-death escape, two event-driven windfalls. All 225 months are plotted; nothing is smoothed away.

02 / 07

2007 — listing at the peak

2007-06-26 Listed: Issue price RMB 8.48, first day opening RMB 15.52 - The peak of the cycle is the best issuance window In 2007-10, the nominal price reached RMB 68.4 (forward-adjusted monthly line 23.57); the BDI collapse began two months later

03 / 07

2013 — the *ST designation

2011/2012 net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent -104.49 / -95.59 × RMB 100 million, renamed on 2013-03-29 *ST Sino-Ocean

04 / 07

2016 — restructuring for survival

2016-02 merged with China Shipping container shipping and divested dry bulk; 2016 full year -99.06 × RMB 100 million is the cost of restructuring; BDI 2016-02-10 saw a record low of 290

05 / 07

2020 — CNY 1.33 on the eve of the pandemic

2020-05 forward-adjusted monthly RMB 1.33: the lowest area in 19 years (the monthly lowest was 1.14 in 2013-07)

06 / 07

2021 — the tenfold rally

SCFI peak of 5109.60 in 2022-01; COSCO Shipping Holdings 2021/2022 profit attributable to shareholders of CNY 89.296 / 109.595 billion (892.96 / 1095.95 × CNY 100 million)

07 / 07

2024 / 2026 — two event-driven windfalls

The Red Sea crisis started in 2023-12, and SCFI peaked at 3733.8 in 2024-07-05. 2026-02-28 The United States and Israel attacked Iran, and Hormuz was closed in March: the two corridors were blocked at the same time for the first time; SCFI 2026-07-10 reported 3184.83

Source: AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)

+1 more sources

• iFinD: 601919.SH forward-adjusted monthly series, 2019→2026-07

· as of 2026-07-10 · akshare stock_zh_a_daily(adjust=qfq) daily resampled to month-end OHLCV; CNY; forward-adjusted

Three freight markets, three curves: since 1988, divergence has been far more common than synchronization

SCFI/CCFI (container shipping), BDI (dry bulk), and BDTI (tankers) must be charted separately under their own definitions: they occasionally move in the same direction but never converge into one cycle.

The three peak peaks of container shipping (2022-01, 2024-07, 2026-07) are all event peaks, and there is no demand peak after order digestion.

BDI observations at 11793/663/290/5650 do not track the container-shipping cycle

The continuous weekly CCFI series is not available in machine-readable form; this report uses only verifiable disclosed observations

01 / 07

Three methodologies, three panels

Container rates are disclosed points (SCFI circles, CCFI squares) — never connected or interpolated. BDI and BDTI are continuous monthly means. The charts are deliberately not spliced together.

02 / 07

1988–2002: the gap is the evidence

In the era of shipping-conference pricing, container shipping rates are not machine-readable or splicable—this page makes the gap explicit. CCFI was first launched on 1998-04-13; it was previously shipping-conference pricing (USITC file)

03 / 07

2003–2008: genuine boom, borrowed orders

China's WTO accession generated real demand, but credit created the 56–68% orderbook; BDI fell from 11793 to 663 in just seven months.

04 / 07

2009–2016: eight years of clearing

At the floor of BDI 290 and CCFI 632.36, China COSCO earned an *ST designation after two consecutive loss-making years, while Hanjin disappeared outright—capacity exit occurred in three forms.

05 / 07

2017–2019: a fragile recovery

The rebound after clearing was narrow and brittle: BDI one-year amplitude 595 → 2518, and the rush to ship in 2018 proved that what looks like demand may not be demand.

06 / 07

2020–2022: the same pandemic, three fates

In the same year that SCFI rose from about 1000 to 5109.6, tankers posted five consecutive loss-making quarters and dry bulk did not catch up until 2021—the textbook answer to why 'shipping is not one cycle.'

07 / 07

2023–2026: three clocks again

SCFI 3,184.83, BDI 2,944 (+101% YoY), BDTI 2,031 — one event, three supply positions, as of 2026-07-10.

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)

+4 more sources

• FreightAmigo: SCFI historical trend (2026-04-16: 1890.77)
• FreightAmigo: SCFI peak of 5109.60 in 2022-01
• Caixin topic page: 2024-07-05 SCFI 3733.80
• AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988 on; tanker 2001 on)

· as of 2026-07-10 · disclosed points only; no interpolation

Meet the old table first: half of the 2008 players are no longer in the game

The survivors of the previous cycle were selected through bankruptcy, restructuring, and M&A—before reading the old cycle, identify who subsequently disappeared.

Container shipping reduced its workforce through mergers and acquisitions (Hanjin went bankrupt, APL/OOCL/Hamburg Süd was acquired)

Dry bulk relies on restructuring (Genco) and divestiture (China COSCO Holdings bulk cargo)

Tankers relied on Chapter 11 (OSG) and recent consolidation (CMB.TECH)

Container · 13 seats

Maersk

MSC

CMA CGM

China COSCO (container shipping)

China Shipping Container Lines

Hanjin Shipping HanjinBankrupt / exited

APL(NOL)

Evergreen Marine

Hapag-Lloyd

ZIM

Hamburg Süd

OOCL

HMM (Hyundai Merchant Marine)

Dry bulk · 8 seats

China COSCO (dry bulk)

DryShipsBankrupt / exited

Genco

Eagle Bulk

Diana

Golden Ocean

Star Bulk

China Merchants Energy Shipping (dry bulk)

Tanker · 5 seats

Frontline

OSG

Teekay

Euronav

China Merchants Energy Shipping (tankers)

01 / 04

The full 2008 table

Thirteen container lines, eight dry-bulk owners, five tanker players — everyone who held chips when BDI printed five digits.

02 / 04

Bankruptcy and restructuring

Hanjin filed for court receivership on 2016-08-31 and was declared bankrupt on 2017-02-17 — the largest container-shipping bankruptcy in more than 50 years. DryShips burned through repeated reverse splits; Genco and OSG survived through Chapter 11.

03 / 04

Mergers and rescues

APL, OOCL and Hamburg Süd were acquired; China Shipping Container Lines merged into COSCO; HMM survived on state support; Eagle Bulk folded into Star Bulk; Golden Ocean into CMB.TECH.

04 / 04

The 2026 seating chart

Survivors, the renamed and the restructured keep their seats — roughly half the table. Everything else is a tombstone or a subsidiary.

Source: Seatrade, 2017-02-17: Hanjin declared bankrupt

+6 more sources

• Korea Herald, 2025-12-11: HMM sale process restarts
• Eastmoney 2013-03-28: China COSCO Holdings changed its name to *ST Ocean
• Caixin Weekly 2022-11-05 "COSCO Prepares for a New Cycle"
• Star Bulk announcement, 2024-04-09: completed absorption of Eagle Bulk
• CMB.TECH announcement, 2025-08-20: completed absorption of Golden Ocean
• breakbulk, 2026-04-10: Hapag to acquire ZIM for USD 4.2 billion (42 × USD 100 million)

· as of 2026-07-11 · fates cross-checked with the extinction and consolidation ledger

Losses hit the financial statements quarter by quarter: capacity exit in the 2011–2016 quarterly income statements

Breaking the annual reports' 'two years of massive losses' into quarters reveals six years of persistently negative margins punctuated by several asset-sale spikes.

2011–2016 clearing · 2020–2022 boom · 2024–2026 current

Six years of persistently negative margins: the positive pulses in 2014–2015 came from asset-sale quarters; earnings excluding non-recurring items stayed negative (-14 / -46 x CNY 100 million). Quarterly values are derived by differencing cumulative statements.

Source: AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)

+1 more sources

• iFinD: 601919.SH three financial statements and profitability metrics (2012/2021–2025)

· as of 2026-07-10 · quarterly = cumulative-statement difference (derived)

Proportion of orderbook to fleet: 2007–2008 leverage, only half returned in 2026

In 2007, container shipping orderbook 56% and dry bulk 67.6% in 2008 were "borrowed prosperity"; in 2026, container shipping 38-39% has returned to the same magnitude range, while dry bulk 7% is a historically unusual restraint.

One isometric layer equals five percentage points of the active fleet. Fractional top layers are preserved; missing disclosures stay missing.

Source: Hapag-Lloyd prospectus: 2007 orderbook ≈56% of fleet

+3 more sources

• Notteboom/VLIZ: 2008-07 orderbook, dry bulk 67.6% / containers 53.2%
• Costamare 20-F: orderbook 8.4% (2020-10) →23.1% (2021-12)
• SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%

· as of 2026-07-10 · TEU for container; dwt for dry bulk and tanker

Freight rates lead earnings by one to four quarters: two lead-lag comparisons

Container shipping lags behind by 1-4 quarters due to long-term contract buffering, and tanker shipping lags by 1-2 quarters due to spot direct delivery - people who read freight rates always arrive earlier than people who read income statements.

container shipping: CCFI disclosure point vs COSCO Shipping Holdingsquarterly net profit margin, 2020Q1→2026Q1

Tanker shipping: quarterly average BDTI vs. China Merchants Energy Shipping quarterly net margin, using continuous series for close analysis

CCFI consists of disclosed observations rather than a continuous series; read the two charts vertically without mixing their axes

Container: CCFI disclosed points vs. COSCO quarterly attributable margin (shift up to 4 quarters)

Play the lagShifted right by 0 quarters■ COSCO attributable margin (left)   — CCFI (right)

Tanker: quarterly mean BDTI vs. CMES quarterly net margin (shift up to 2 quarters)

Play the lagShifted right by 0 quarters■ CMES net margin (left)   — BDTI quarterly mean (right)

Source: SSE (via Sina): 2022-01 CCFI monthly average 3510.83

+3 more sources

• SIMIC 2025 review: CCFI annual average 1197.60
• Shanghai Shipping Exchange CCFI website (2026-07-10: 1873.15)
• AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)

· as of 2026-07-10 · read the two charts vertically; axes are independent

Five-window scorecard: which historical period most resembles today, and which least resembles it

The outlook for container shipping is most like the beginning of 2009-2016 (an overhanging orderbook), the outlook for dry bulk is least like any history of excess, and the outlook for tankers is a new chapter of 2022.

1988–2002

Containerization penetration

Shipping-conference pricing collapses and container shipping index is absent
Freight rates: Container shipping is not available (BDI background) · Orderbook: No publicly available definition

NEGATIVE CONTROL

2003–2008

demand_pull

China's WTO-accession demand boom + orderbook leverage
Freight rates: BDI 11793→663 · Orderbook: Set 56% / Dry 67.6%

MIXED

2009–2016

oversupply

Delivery Flood + Eight Years Clearance of Demand Collapse
Freight rates: BDI 290; CCFI 632.36 · Orderbook: Peak -43%

SAME SCRIPT

2017–2019

policy

Fragile recovery after clearing + policy costs
Freight rates: BDI 595–2518 · Orderbook: low position

DIFFERENT

2020–2022

logistics_disruption + demand

Pandemic-driven goods-for-services substitution + congestion
Freight rates: SCFI 5109.60; BDTI 2020 peak→2021 trough · Orderbook: 8.4%→23.1%

EVENT SAMPLE

Rejected: 1973–1986 tanker boom—Great Depression

Why it is tempting: Geopolitical shock → skyrocketing freight rates → excess orders → long depression, similar to the narrative of Hormuz

Why excluded: Predates the main window beginning in 1988; no container liner market existed then; freight-rate definitions cannot be spliced onto the index era (mechanism mismatch + data not comparable)

Rejected: “2021 dry bulk spike and container shipping are in the same big cycle”

Why it is tempting: BDI 5650 and SCFI 5109.6 peaked in the same year in 2021, with similar curve shapes

Why excluded: Different drivers: dry bulk = coal/ore restocking + congestion; container shipping = goods-for-services substitution + port congestion; moving in the same direction in the same year ≠ the same cycle (negative_control retained)

Rule preserved: shape similarity is not mechanism identity. Two curves peaking in the same year does not make them the same cycle.

Source: FAO Food Outlook 2008: Ocean freight(IGC)

+4 more sources

• AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988→; tankers 2001→2026-07)
• Hapag-Lloyd prospectus: 2007 orderbook ≈56% of fleet
• UNCTAD RMT 2012: orderbook -43% from the 2008 peak
• Costamare 20-F: orderbook 8.4% (2020-10) →23.1% (2021-12)

· as of 2026-07-11 · shape similarity is not mechanism identity

What can and cannot transmit across subsectors

Capital and sentiment can transmit across segments (orders, vessel prices, risk pricing); demand and measurement conventions cannot (cargo types, contracts, index definitions).

Stock price 2020=100 Rebase: Seven types of shipowners trace seven distinct paths, and divergence was priced in early

Orderbook and ship age are subsector-specific variables and cannot be extrapolated across subsectors.

BDI does not substitute for container freight rates, and tanker earnings cannot be extrapolated to container-shipping profit

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)

+3 more sources

• AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988→; tankers 2001→2026-07)
• SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%
• Riviera/Clarksons, 2025-11-10: tanker earnings at a 19-month high; orderbook at 14.7%

· as of 2026-07-10 · prohibitions from the same-date comparison table

Three industries now

But the orderbook structure is completely different: 38–39% for containers (delivery peak in 2029), about 7% for dry bulk (multi-year low), and about 15% for tankers (rising from lows). Under the same wave of geopolitical price sensitivity, the three supply curves point to three different outlooks.

Container shipping currently = event tension covers the eve of the delivery peak (more like the supply side at the end of 2007, not like the demand side in 2003-2006); dry bulk = early upswing with event-driven windfalls superimposed on a thin supply cushion; tanker shipping = sanctions and detours prolong the latter part of the boom but orders begin to pick up. The stage signals of the three sub-sectors cannot be applied to each other.

Container shipping

▼ We are here now

Freight-rate normalization

Event-driven tightness

Delivery for peak digestion

Rebalancing supply and demand

2025From 2026-022027–2029 (forward)Undetermined

3,184.83

SCFI composite (2026-07-10)

Shanghai Shipping Exchange

1,873.15

CCFI composite (2026-07-10)

Shanghai Shipping Exchange

38.3–39%

orderbook as share of fleet; delivery peak 2029

Alphaliner / SAFETY4SEA, 2026-06-24

-86%

Suez Canal container transits vs. 2023

same-date comparison, 2026-07-10

SCFI 3184.83 is an event-driven rate, not a demand-driven rate; the real variable is whether the 2027–2029 delivery wave or the resumption of normal routing comes first.

Dry bulk

▼ We are here now

bottom observation

Early upcycle

Renewed expansion

overheating

2023–2024 LowFrom 2025To be confirmed on demandUndetermined

2,944

BDI (2026-07-10, +101% YoY)

akshare daily

~7%

orderbook as share of fleet (multi-year low)

Clarksons via Benzinga, 2026-02-16

3,620 x 10,000 dwt

2025 deliveries; ordering stays restrained

SBLK call / Clarksons

BCI > BPI

large vessels capture the gains; not broad-based

akshare monthly means

BDI +101% YoY looks like a major cycle, but decomposes into a 7% orderbook + rerouting-driven ton-miles + a Hormuz premium—an early upcycle in which demand is only part of the driver mix.

Tanker shipping

▼ We are here now

Margin pressure

Early recovery

Upcycle

Overheating/reversal

Five consecutive quarters of losses in 20212022 Rosneft RestructuringFrom 2023Pending orders and scrapping votes

2,031 / 1,048

BDTI / BCTI (2026-07-10)

akshare daily

14.7%

orderbook as share of fleet (up from 7%)

Riviera / Clarksons, 2025-11-10

USD 559.1M

Frontline 2026Q1 net profit — one Hormuz quarter

yfinance quarterly statement

~0

tanker scrapping (36 vessels in 9M 2025)

Riviera / Clarksons, 2025-11

Earnings reached a 19-month high and profits set records—tankers have delivered the strongest earnings realization of the three subsectors; the open questions are a 14.7% orderbook and zero scrapping.

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)

+3 more sources

• AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988→; tankers 2001→2026-07)
• SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%
• Riviera/Clarksons, 2025-11-10: tanker earnings at a 19-month high; orderbook at 14.7%

· as of 2026-07-10 · stages tentative; metric cards carry their own citations

What to watch next: confirmation and invalidation checklist for the three subsectors

Every signal includes a threshold, source, and invalidation point—shipping is not one cycle, so it cannot be monitored on a single shared dashboard.

container shipping: traffic recovery vs orderbook delivery, who comes first?

Dry bulk: can BDI remain above 1500 without triggering new orders?

Tanker shipping: pace of earnings normalization vs. when scrapping accelerates

Suez/Hormuz transit volumeEVENT

Current value

Suez approximately -60% vs. 2023 (first week of 2026, BIMCO)

Threshold

Recovery to over 90% by 2023

Expected lag

Freight rates lag transit volumes by 2-6 weeks

Falsifier

A prolonged low-rate regime becomes the new normal, resetting the freight-rate floor

Status: missing · BIMCO via gol.ua/indiaseatradenews · 2026-03-20

container shipping freight SCFI/CCFIPRICE

Current value

SCFI 3184.83 / CCFI 1873.15(2026-07-10)

Threshold

Back to 2019 Hub (CCFI<900) = Event Premium Clearing

Expected lag

Leads earnings by 1-4 quarters

Falsifier

Freight rates remain elevated after rerouting ends, with cargo volumes providing confirmation

Status: partial · Shanghai Shipping Exchange website · 2026-07-10

container-shipping orderbook deliveriesCAPACITY

Current value

38.3–39% (1298–1328 × 10,000 TEU)

Threshold

2027–2029 Delivery vs Cancellation Rate; Delivery Peak 2029

Expected lag

Freight price will be lowered 1-2 quarters after delivery

Falsifier

Mass cancellation/postponement of orders

Status: met · Alphaliner/Linerlytica 2026-06 · 2026-06-24

dry bulk BDIPRICE

Current value

2944 (2026-07-10, +101% year-on-year)

Threshold

Fall back below 1500 and stay = end of uptrend

Expected lag

Leads carrier earnings by 1-2 quarters

Falsifier

Iron ore/coal cargo volumes invalidate the ton-mile thesis

Status: partial · akshare daily · 2026-07-10

dry-bulk orderbookCAPACITY

Current value

Approximately 7% (multi-year low)

Threshold

Rises to 15%+ = supply discipline breaks down

Expected lag

Delivery 2-3 years after ordering

Falsifier

Dry-bulk ordering wave

Status: met · Clarksons via Benzinga/FINVIZ · 2026-02-16

Tanker earnings/orderbookPRICE

Current value

Weighted income is nearly 5 × USD 10,000/day (2025-10); orderbook 14.7%

Threshold

Earnings fall back to the ten-year average (about 2.5 × 10,000/day, or 25,000/day) or the orderbook continues to rise

Expected lag

Earnings flow directly into current-period profit

Falsifier

Sanctions ease + higher OPEC output pressures rates

Status: partial · Riviera/Clarksons 2025-11 · 2025-11-10

Tanker scrappingCAPACITY

Current value

Scrapping was nearly zero (only 36 vessels in the first 9 months of 2025)

Threshold

Surge in scrapping of older vessels (>20 years) = confirmation of the late-cycle phase

Expected lag

Coincident with or slightly after the freight-rate peak

Falsifier

The dark fleet will absorb old ships and the compliant fleet will not be dismantled

Status: missing · Riviera/Clarksons 2025-11 · 2025-11-10

Anchor-company quarterly net marginFINANCIALS

Current value

2026Q1 11.35% (COSCO Shipping Holdings)

Threshold

Two consecutive quarters of sequential improvement = event impact has reached earnings

Expected lag

Lags freight rates by 1-4 quarters

Falsifier

Profit margin falls back to the 2019 level (<5%)

Status: partial · sina/iFinD income-statement differencing · 2026-04-30

Source: Monitoring checklist: thresholds, sources, and falsifiers as registered in the analysis workbook · as of 2026-07-10 · eight signals across price, capacity, event, and financials

Definitions, gaps, and disclaimers: what this report cannot answer

All known gaps are disclosed; the two most important are the unavailable continuous CCFI series and the lack of verifiable container freight rates before 2003.

Gap	Scope of impact	Processing method
The continuous weekly CCFI/SCFI series is not available in machine-readable form	Long chart of container shipping rates (p04/p12/p15)	Official/authoritative disclosure of key time point values + legend stating that it is non-continuous and does not interpolate
There is no public index for container shipping rates from 1988–2002	W0 window (p05)	Structural gap page + retrieval ladder; BDI is background only, not a substitute
iFinD monthly history begins in 2019	Anchor-company share price, 2007–2018 (p03)	akshare substitute (upstream source: sina), with definitions labeled in separate columns
Yahoo ^BDIY unavailable / GOGL only 2 rows	dry bulk index and peer (p04/p14)	akshare substitute; GOGL marked as delisted in the ledger
No cross-market FX conversion	rebased chart (p14)	Priced in local currency, only comparing relative forms
Image-generation capability unavailable	2 explainer bits (p01/p02)	Visible gap + structured diagram on the same page (pre-authorized by the user)

Known limitations

1. The continuous weekly CCFI/SCFI series is not available in machine-readable form (Shanghai Shipping Exchange subscription); the container freight-rate chart uses only official/authoritative observations at key dates, is non-continuous, and does not interpolate between observations.
2. From 1988 to 2002, container shipping was in the era of shipping-conference pricing, and there was no public unified freight index; the container shipping freight rate in this window was a structural gap, and the BDI was only used as a background and did not replace the history of container shipping.
3. iFinD get_price monthly history begins around 2019 (earlier queries return EMPTY_DATA); the 2007–2018 monthly series for 601919 uses akshare instead (upstream source: sina; forward-adjusted), with the two definitions shown in separate columns.
4. yfinance ^BDIY is unavailable (404); BDI/BCI/BPI/BCTI/BDTI now use akshare. After GOGL merged into CMB.TECH in 2025-08, Yahoo retained only 2 rows; the dry-bulk peer set now uses SBLK and 601872.
5. The cross-market rebased chart is denominated in local currencies (auto-adjust); no FX conversion is applied, and only relative patterns are compared.
6. Quarterly data for COSCO Shipping Holdings/China Merchants Energy Shipping are derived by differencing cumulative statements (derived); 2016 includes non-recurring restructuring items, while 2014–2015 profit attributable to shareholders includes spikes from asset sales.
7. China Merchants Energy Shipping is a diversified operator (tankers/dry bulk/LNG/ro-ro); its margin is not a pure-play tanker metric.
8. Because image generation is unavailable in this session, two generated-explainer slots are replaced, under the user's prior authorization, with visible gaps + structured diagrams on the same page (not_evidence=true).
9. The Hormuz/Red Sea incident from February to July 2026 is still evolving; freight rates and traffic volumes are as of 2026-07-10.

Report title: Global shipping is not one cycle: alongside the container-shipping narrative, where are dry bulk and tanker shipping in their respective cycles?
Source pack: Data source file: 0710-vibe-global shipping (timemachine_report.json / charts.json; data through 2026-07-10)
Run id: not recorded in the source pack
Data through: 2026-07-10
Method reference: scrollytelling essay conventions popularized by The Pudding (see NOTES-pudding.md).
Disclaimer: This report is a historical cycle study and does not constitute any investment operation statement (no direction recommendations, no point predictions, and no return commitments).

Source: Timemachine run log (run_log.md / connector_log.md) · as of 2026-07-11 · the complete gap register; nothing silently spliced