Deniz Taşımacılığı Tek Bir Döngü Değildir

Konteyner, kuru yük ve tanker için %1,7, %0,3 ve %0,6 sipariş defteri-filo oranları; her gemi türü, tarihli SCFI ve BDI değerleriyle kendi değerlendirmesini alıyor.

Deep Research'ü deneyin Üyelik avantajlarını görüntüle

A scrollytelling essay on three freight markets

Shipping Is Not One Cycle

Alongside the container-shipping narrative — where are dry bulk and tanker shipping in their respective cycles?

Data through 2026-07-10 · anchor company: COSCO Shipping Holdings · every figure sourced on the page

38.7% — Container orderbook, % of fleet (2026-06)
7.0% — Dry-bulk orderbook, % of fleet (2026-06)
14.7% — Tanker orderbook, % of fleet (2025-09)

SCROLL▼

One industry, three clocks

No historical period explains all three subsectors at once: the container-shipping orderbook resembles 2007, dry bulk resembles the post-2016 period, and tankers are a new regime that emerged in 2022—the answer must be segmented by vessel type.

Same case: If the delivery wave coincides with the end of rerouting, container shipping enters a 2009–2016-style shakeout.

Different case: The dry bulk/tanker shipping orderbook is thin, and the prosperity is not determined by the container shipping clock.

Container shipping

Event-driven tightness (front-loaded orderbook)

SCFI 3,184.83

On the eve of margin pressure — Premium persists; delivery wave has not yet arrived. Event-driven tightness overlays a 38–39% orderbook with deliveries peaking in 2029.

Shanghai Shipping Exchange / Alphaliner, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: SCFI 3184 / CCFI 1873

Dry bulk

Early upcycle (tentative)

BDI 2,944

Early upcycle / renewed expansion — BDI +101%, earnings at a new high. A ~7% orderbook (multi-year low) meets rerouting-driven ton-miles.

akshare daily / Clarksons via Benzinga, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: BDI 2944(+101%)

Tanker shipping

Renewed expansion (tentative)

BDTI 2,031

Renewed expansion — earnings at a 19-month high and 2025 profits at a record; scrapping near zero while the fleet ages.

akshare daily / Riviera-Clarksons, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: BDTI 2031 / BCTI 1048

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI/CCFI website (2026-07-10)

+1 more sources

SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%

· as of 2026-07-10 · answer box v2

Nineteen years of the anchor company: one listing at the peak, one near-death escape, and two event-driven windfalls

COSCO Shipping Holdings' share-price curve is a living chronology of the container-shipping cycle: listing at the 2007 peak, *ST designation in 2013, and two event-driven windfalls in 2021 and 2024/2026.

IPO price RMB 8.48 in 2007-06, reaching RMB 68.4 in month 10: the cycle peak was the ideal issuance window

Reorganization and name change from *ST in 2013 to 2016: The shakeout left its mark on both the share price and the financial statements

RMB 1.33 from the end of 2020 to ten times in 2021: leading freight rate, mid-range stock price, and trailing profit

01 / 07

Nineteen years in one line

The full forward-adjusted monthly curve, 2007-06 to 2026-07: one listing at the peak, one near-death escape, two event-driven windfalls. All 225 months are plotted; nothing is smoothed away.

02 / 07

2007 — listing at the peak

2007-06-26 Listed: Issue price RMB 8.48, first day opening RMB 15.52 - The peak of the cycle is the best issuance window In 2007-10, the nominal price reached RMB 68.4 (forward-adjusted monthly line 23.57); the BDI collapse began two months later

03 / 07

2013 — the *ST designation

2011/2012 net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent -104.49 / -95.59 × RMB 100 million, renamed on 2013-03-29 *ST Sino-Ocean

04 / 07

2016 — restructuring for survival

2016-02 merged with China Shipping container shipping and divested dry bulk; 2016 full year -99.06 × RMB 100 million is the cost of restructuring; BDI 2016-02-10 saw a record low of 290

05 / 07

2020 — CNY 1.33 on the eve of the pandemic

2020-05 forward-adjusted monthly RMB 1.33: the lowest area in 19 years (the monthly lowest was 1.14 in 2013-07)

06 / 07

2021 — the tenfold rally

SCFI peak of 5109.60 in 2022-01; COSCO Shipping Holdings 2021/2022 profit attributable to shareholders of CNY 89.296 / 109.595 billion (892.96 / 1095.95 × CNY 100 million)

07 / 07

2024 / 2026 — two event-driven windfalls

The Red Sea crisis started in 2023-12, and SCFI peaked at 3733.8 in 2024-07-05. 2026-02-28 The United States and Israel attacked Iran, and Hormuz was closed in March: the two corridors were blocked at the same time for the first time; SCFI 2026-07-10 reported 3184.83

Source: AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)

+1 more sources

iFinD: 601919.SH forward-adjusted monthly series, 2019→2026-07

· as of 2026-07-10 · akshare stock_zh_a_daily(adjust=qfq) daily resampled to month-end OHLCV; CNY; forward-adjusted

Three freight markets, three curves: since 1988, divergence has been far more common than synchronization

SCFI/CCFI (container shipping), BDI (dry bulk), and BDTI (tankers) must be charted separately under their own definitions: they occasionally move in the same direction but never converge into one cycle.

The three peak peaks of container shipping (2022-01, 2024-07, 2026-07) are all event peaks, and there is no demand peak after order digestion.

BDI observations at 11793/663/290/5650 do not track the container-shipping cycle

The continuous weekly CCFI series is not available in machine-readable form; this report uses only verifiable disclosed observations

01 / 07

Three methodologies, three panels

Container rates are disclosed points (SCFI circles, CCFI squares) — never connected or interpolated. BDI and BDTI are continuous monthly means. The charts are deliberately not spliced together.

02 / 07

1988–2002: the gap is the evidence

In the era of shipping-conference pricing, container shipping rates are not machine-readable or splicable—this page makes the gap explicit. CCFI was first launched on 1998-04-13; it was previously shipping-conference pricing (USITC file)

03 / 07

2003–2008: genuine boom, borrowed orders

China's WTO accession generated real demand, but credit created the 56–68% orderbook; BDI fell from 11793 to 663 in just seven months.

04 / 07

2009–2016: eight years of clearing

At the floor of BDI 290 and CCFI 632.36, China COSCO earned an *ST designation after two consecutive loss-making years, while Hanjin disappeared outright—capacity exit occurred in three forms.

05 / 07

2017–2019: a fragile recovery

The rebound after clearing was narrow and brittle: BDI one-year amplitude 595 → 2518, and the rush to ship in 2018 proved that what looks like demand may not be demand.

06 / 07

2020–2022: the same pandemic, three fates

In the same year that SCFI rose from about 1000 to 5109.6, tankers posted five consecutive loss-making quarters and dry bulk did not catch up until 2021—the textbook answer to why 'shipping is not one cycle.'

07 / 07

2023–2026: three clocks again

SCFI 3,184.83, BDI 2,944 (+101% YoY), BDTI 2,031 — one event, three supply positions, as of 2026-07-10.

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)

+4 more sources

· as of 2026-07-10 · disclosed points only; no interpolation

Meet the old table first: half of the 2008 players are no longer in the game

The survivors of the previous cycle were selected through bankruptcy, restructuring, and M&A—before reading the old cycle, identify who subsequently disappeared.

Container shipping reduced its workforce through mergers and acquisitions (Hanjin went bankrupt, APL/OOCL/Hamburg Süd was acquired)

Dry bulk relies on restructuring (Genco) and divestiture (China COSCO Holdings bulk cargo)

Tankers relied on Chapter 11 (OSG) and recent consolidation (CMB.TECH)

Container · 13 seats

Maersk

MSC

CMA CGM

China COSCO (container shipping)

China Shipping Container Lines

Hanjin Shipping HanjinBankrupt / exited

APL(NOL)

Evergreen Marine

Hapag-Lloyd

ZIM

Hamburg Süd

OOCL

HMM (Hyundai Merchant Marine)

Dry bulk · 8 seats

China COSCO (dry bulk)

DryShipsBankrupt / exited

Genco

Eagle Bulk

Diana

Golden Ocean

Star Bulk

China Merchants Energy Shipping (dry bulk)

Tanker · 5 seats

Frontline

OSG

Teekay

Euronav

China Merchants Energy Shipping (tankers)

01 / 04

The full 2008 table

Thirteen container lines, eight dry-bulk owners, five tanker players — everyone who held chips when BDI printed five digits.

02 / 04

Bankruptcy and restructuring

Hanjin filed for court receivership on 2016-08-31 and was declared bankrupt on 2017-02-17 — the largest container-shipping bankruptcy in more than 50 years. DryShips burned through repeated reverse splits; Genco and OSG survived through Chapter 11.

03 / 04

Mergers and rescues

APL, OOCL and Hamburg Süd were acquired; China Shipping Container Lines merged into COSCO; HMM survived on state support; Eagle Bulk folded into Star Bulk; Golden Ocean into CMB.TECH.

04 / 04

The 2026 seating chart

Survivors, the renamed and the restructured keep their seats — roughly half the table. Everything else is a tombstone or a subsidiary.

Source: Seatrade, 2017-02-17: Hanjin declared bankrupt

+6 more sources

· as of 2026-07-11 · fates cross-checked with the extinction and consolidation ledger

Losses hit the financial statements quarter by quarter: capacity exit in the 2011–2016 quarterly income statements

Breaking the annual reports' 'two years of massive losses' into quarters reveals six years of persistently negative margins punctuated by several asset-sale spikes.

2011–2016 clearing · 2020–2022 boom · 2024–2026 current

Six years of persistently negative margins: the positive pulses in 2014–2015 came from asset-sale quarters; earnings excluding non-recurring items stayed negative (-14 / -46 x CNY 100 million). Quarterly values are derived by differencing cumulative statements.

Source: AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)

+1 more sources

iFinD: 601919.SH three financial statements and profitability metrics (2012/2021–2025)

· as of 2026-07-10 · quarterly = cumulative-statement difference (derived)

Proportion of orderbook to fleet: 2007–2008 leverage, only half returned in 2026

In 2007, container shipping orderbook 56% and dry bulk 67.6% in 2008 were "borrowed prosperity"; in 2026, container shipping 38-39% has returned to the same magnitude range, while dry bulk 7% is a historically unusual restraint.

One isometric layer equals five percentage points of the active fleet. Fractional top layers are preserved; missing disclosures stay missing.

Source: Hapag-Lloyd prospectus: 2007 orderbook ≈56% of fleet

+3 more sources

· as of 2026-07-10 · TEU for container; dwt for dry bulk and tanker

Freight rates lead earnings by one to four quarters: two lead-lag comparisons

Container shipping lags behind by 1-4 quarters due to long-term contract buffering, and tanker shipping lags by 1-2 quarters due to spot direct delivery - people who read freight rates always arrive earlier than people who read income statements.

container shipping: CCFI disclosure point vs COSCO Shipping Holdingsquarterly net profit margin, 2020Q1→2026Q1

Tanker shipping: quarterly average BDTI vs. China Merchants Energy Shipping quarterly net margin, using continuous series for close analysis

CCFI consists of disclosed observations rather than a continuous series; read the two charts vertically without mixing their axes

Container: CCFI disclosed points vs. COSCO quarterly attributable margin (shift up to 4 quarters)

Play the lagShifted right by 0 quarters■ COSCO attributable margin (left) — CCFI (right)

Tanker: quarterly mean BDTI vs. CMES quarterly net margin (shift up to 2 quarters)

Play the lagShifted right by 0 quarters■ CMES net margin (left) — BDTI quarterly mean (right)

Source: SSE (via Sina): 2022-01 CCFI monthly average 3510.83

+3 more sources

· as of 2026-07-10 · read the two charts vertically; axes are independent

Five-window scorecard: which historical period most resembles today, and which least resembles it

The outlook for container shipping is most like the beginning of 2009-2016 (an overhanging orderbook), the outlook for dry bulk is least like any history of excess, and the outlook for tankers is a new chapter of 2022.

1988–2002

Containerization penetration

Shipping-conference pricing collapses and container shipping index is absent
Freight rates: Container shipping is not available (BDI background) · Orderbook: No publicly available definition

NEGATIVE CONTROL

2003–2008

demand_pull

China's WTO-accession demand boom + orderbook leverage
Freight rates: BDI 11793→663 · Orderbook: Set 56% / Dry 67.6%

MIXED

2009–2016

oversupply

Delivery Flood + Eight Years Clearance of Demand Collapse
Freight rates: BDI 290; CCFI 632.36 · Orderbook: Peak -43%

SAME SCRIPT

2017–2019

policy

Fragile recovery after clearing + policy costs
Freight rates: BDI 595–2518 · Orderbook: low position

DIFFERENT

2020–2022

logistics_disruption + demand

Pandemic-driven goods-for-services substitution + congestion
Freight rates: SCFI 5109.60; BDTI 2020 peak→2021 trough · Orderbook: 8.4%→23.1%

EVENT SAMPLE

Rejected: 1973–1986 tanker boom—Great Depression

Why it is tempting: Geopolitical shock → skyrocketing freight rates → excess orders → long depression, similar to the narrative of Hormuz

Why excluded: Predates the main window beginning in 1988; no container liner market existed then; freight-rate definitions cannot be spliced onto the index era (mechanism mismatch + data not comparable)

Rejected: “2021 dry bulk spike and container shipping are in the same big cycle”

Why it is tempting: BDI 5650 and SCFI 5109.6 peaked in the same year in 2021, with similar curve shapes

Why excluded: Different drivers: dry bulk = coal/ore restocking + congestion; container shipping = goods-for-services substitution + port congestion; moving in the same direction in the same year ≠ the same cycle (negative_control retained)

Rule preserved: shape similarity is not mechanism identity. Two curves peaking in the same year does not make them the same cycle.

Source: FAO Food Outlook 2008: Ocean freight(IGC)

+4 more sources

· as of 2026-07-11 · shape similarity is not mechanism identity

What can and cannot transmit across subsectors

Capital and sentiment can transmit across segments (orders, vessel prices, risk pricing); demand and measurement conventions cannot (cargo types, contracts, index definitions).

Stock price 2020=100 Rebase: Seven types of shipowners trace seven distinct paths, and divergence was priced in early

Orderbook and ship age are subsector-specific variables and cannot be extrapolated across subsectors.

BDI does not substitute for container freight rates, and tanker earnings cannot be extrapolated to container-shipping profit

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)

+3 more sources

· as of 2026-07-10 · prohibitions from the same-date comparison table

Three industries now

But the orderbook structure is completely different: 38–39% for containers (delivery peak in 2029), about 7% for dry bulk (multi-year low), and about 15% for tankers (rising from lows). Under the same wave of geopolitical price sensitivity, the three supply curves point to three different outlooks.

Container shipping currently = event tension covers the eve of the delivery peak (more like the supply side at the end of 2007, not like the demand side in 2003-2006); dry bulk = early upswing with event-driven windfalls superimposed on a thin supply cushion; tanker shipping = sanctions and detours prolong the latter part of the boom but orders begin to pick up. The stage signals of the three sub-sectors cannot be applied to each other.

Container shipping

▼ We are here now

Freight-rate normalization

Event-driven tightness

Delivery for peak digestion

Rebalancing supply and demand

2025From 2026-022027–2029 (forward)Undetermined

3,184.83

SCFI composite (2026-07-10)

Shanghai Shipping Exchange

1,873.15

CCFI composite (2026-07-10)

Shanghai Shipping Exchange

38.3–39%

orderbook as share of fleet; delivery peak 2029

Alphaliner / SAFETY4SEA, 2026-06-24

-86%

Suez Canal container transits vs. 2023

same-date comparison, 2026-07-10

SCFI 3184.83 is an event-driven rate, not a demand-driven rate; the real variable is whether the 2027–2029 delivery wave or the resumption of normal routing comes first.

Dry bulk

▼ We are here now

bottom observation

Early upcycle

Renewed expansion

overheating

2023–2024 LowFrom 2025To be confirmed on demandUndetermined

2,944

BDI (2026-07-10, +101% YoY)

akshare daily

~7%

orderbook as share of fleet (multi-year low)

Clarksons via Benzinga, 2026-02-16

3,620 x 10,000 dwt

2025 deliveries; ordering stays restrained

SBLK call / Clarksons

BCI > BPI

large vessels capture the gains; not broad-based

akshare monthly means

BDI +101% YoY looks like a major cycle, but decomposes into a 7% orderbook + rerouting-driven ton-miles + a Hormuz premium—an early upcycle in which demand is only part of the driver mix.

Tanker shipping

▼ We are here now

Margin pressure

Early recovery

Upcycle

Overheating/reversal

Five consecutive quarters of losses in 20212022 Rosneft RestructuringFrom 2023Pending orders and scrapping votes

2,031 / 1,048

BDTI / BCTI (2026-07-10)

akshare daily

14.7%

orderbook as share of fleet (up from 7%)

Riviera / Clarksons, 2025-11-10

USD 559.1M

Frontline 2026Q1 net profit — one Hormuz quarter

yfinance quarterly statement

tanker scrapping (36 vessels in 9M 2025)

Riviera / Clarksons, 2025-11

Earnings reached a 19-month high and profits set records—tankers have delivered the strongest earnings realization of the three subsectors; the open questions are a 14.7% orderbook and zero scrapping.

Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)

+3 more sources

· as of 2026-07-10 · stages tentative; metric cards carry their own citations

What to watch next: confirmation and invalidation checklist for the three subsectors

Every signal includes a threshold, source, and invalidation point—shipping is not one cycle, so it cannot be monitored on a single shared dashboard.

container shipping: traffic recovery vs orderbook delivery, who comes first?

Dry bulk: can BDI remain above 1500 without triggering new orders?

Tanker shipping: pace of earnings normalization vs. when scrapping accelerates

Suez/Hormuz transit volumeEVENT

Current value

Suez approximately -60% vs. 2023 (first week of 2026, BIMCO)

Threshold

Recovery to over 90% by 2023

Expected lag

Freight rates lag transit volumes by 2-6 weeks

Falsifier

A prolonged low-rate regime becomes the new normal, resetting the freight-rate floor

Status: missing · BIMCO via gol.ua/indiaseatradenews · 2026-03-20

container shipping freight SCFI/CCFIPRICE

Current value

SCFI 3184.83 / CCFI 1873.15(2026-07-10)

Threshold

Back to 2019 Hub (CCFI<900) = Event Premium Clearing

Expected lag

Leads earnings by 1-4 quarters

Falsifier

Freight rates remain elevated after rerouting ends, with cargo volumes providing confirmation

Status: partial · Shanghai Shipping Exchange website · 2026-07-10

container-shipping orderbook deliveriesCAPACITY

Current value

38.3–39% (1298–1328 × 10,000 TEU)

Threshold

2027–2029 Delivery vs Cancellation Rate; Delivery Peak 2029

Expected lag

Freight price will be lowered 1-2 quarters after delivery

Falsifier

Mass cancellation/postponement of orders

Status: met · Alphaliner/Linerlytica 2026-06 · 2026-06-24

dry bulk BDIPRICE

Current value

2944 (2026-07-10, +101% year-on-year)

Threshold

Fall back below 1500 and stay = end of uptrend

Expected lag

Leads carrier earnings by 1-2 quarters

Falsifier

Iron ore/coal cargo volumes invalidate the ton-mile thesis

Status: partial · akshare daily · 2026-07-10

dry-bulk orderbookCAPACITY

Current value

Approximately 7% (multi-year low)

Threshold

Rises to 15%+ = supply discipline breaks down

Expected lag

Delivery 2-3 years after ordering

Falsifier

Dry-bulk ordering wave

Status: met · Clarksons via Benzinga/FINVIZ · 2026-02-16

Tanker earnings/orderbookPRICE

Current value

Weighted income is nearly 5 × USD 10,000/day (2025-10); orderbook 14.7%

Threshold

Earnings fall back to the ten-year average (about 2.5 × 10,000/day, or 25,000/day) or the orderbook continues to rise

Expected lag

Earnings flow directly into current-period profit

Falsifier

Sanctions ease + higher OPEC output pressures rates

Status: partial · Riviera/Clarksons 2025-11 · 2025-11-10

Tanker scrappingCAPACITY

Current value

Scrapping was nearly zero (only 36 vessels in the first 9 months of 2025)

Threshold

Surge in scrapping of older vessels (>20 years) = confirmation of the late-cycle phase

Expected lag

Coincident with or slightly after the freight-rate peak

Falsifier

The dark fleet will absorb old ships and the compliant fleet will not be dismantled

Status: missing · Riviera/Clarksons 2025-11 · 2025-11-10

Anchor-company quarterly net marginFINANCIALS

Current value

2026Q1 11.35% (COSCO Shipping Holdings)

Threshold

Two consecutive quarters of sequential improvement = event impact has reached earnings

Expected lag

Lags freight rates by 1-4 quarters

Falsifier

Profit margin falls back to the 2019 level (<5%)

Status: partial · sina/iFinD income-statement differencing · 2026-04-30

Source: Monitoring checklist: thresholds, sources, and falsifiers as registered in the analysis workbook · as of 2026-07-10 · eight signals across price, capacity, event, and financials

Definitions, gaps, and disclaimers: what this report cannot answer

All known gaps are disclosed; the two most important are the unavailable continuous CCFI series and the lack of verifiable container freight rates before 2003.

Gap	Scope of impact	Processing method
The continuous weekly CCFI/SCFI series is not available in machine-readable form	Long chart of container shipping rates (p04/p12/p15)	Official/authoritative disclosure of key time point values + legend stating that it is non-continuous and does not interpolate
There is no public index for container shipping rates from 1988–2002	W0 window (p05)	Structural gap page + retrieval ladder; BDI is background only, not a substitute
iFinD monthly history begins in 2019	Anchor-company share price, 2007–2018 (p03)	akshare substitute (upstream source: sina), with definitions labeled in separate columns
Yahoo ^BDIY unavailable / GOGL only 2 rows	dry bulk index and peer (p04/p14)	akshare substitute; GOGL marked as delisted in the ledger
No cross-market FX conversion	rebased chart (p14)	Priced in local currency, only comparing relative forms
Image-generation capability unavailable	2 explainer bits (p01/p02)	Visible gap + structured diagram on the same page (pre-authorized by the user)

Known limitations

The continuous weekly CCFI/SCFI series is not available in machine-readable form (Shanghai Shipping Exchange subscription); the container freight-rate chart uses only official/authoritative observations at key dates, is non-continuous, and does not interpolate between observations.
From 1988 to 2002, container shipping was in the era of shipping-conference pricing, and there was no public unified freight index; the container shipping freight rate in this window was a structural gap, and the BDI was only used as a background and did not replace the history of container shipping.
iFinD get_price monthly history begins around 2019 (earlier queries return EMPTY_DATA); the 2007–2018 monthly series for 601919 uses akshare instead (upstream source: sina; forward-adjusted), with the two definitions shown in separate columns.
yfinance ^BDIY is unavailable (404); BDI/BCI/BPI/BCTI/BDTI now use akshare. After GOGL merged into CMB.TECH in 2025-08, Yahoo retained only 2 rows; the dry-bulk peer set now uses SBLK and 601872.
The cross-market rebased chart is denominated in local currencies (auto-adjust); no FX conversion is applied, and only relative patterns are compared.
Quarterly data for COSCO Shipping Holdings/China Merchants Energy Shipping are derived by differencing cumulative statements (derived); 2016 includes non-recurring restructuring items, while 2014–2015 profit attributable to shareholders includes spikes from asset sales.
China Merchants Energy Shipping is a diversified operator (tankers/dry bulk/LNG/ro-ro); its margin is not a pure-play tanker metric.
Because image generation is unavailable in this session, two generated-explainer slots are replaced, under the user's prior authorization, with visible gaps + structured diagrams on the same page (not_evidence=true).
The Hormuz/Red Sea incident from February to July 2026 is still evolving; freight rates and traffic volumes are as of 2026-07-10.

Report title: Global shipping is not one cycle: alongside the container-shipping narrative, where are dry bulk and tanker shipping in their respective cycles?
Source pack: Data source file: 0710-vibe-global shipping (timemachine_report.json / charts.json; data through 2026-07-10)
Run id: not recorded in the source pack
Data through: 2026-07-10
Method reference: scrollytelling essay conventions popularized by The Pudding (see NOTES-pudding.md).
Disclaimer: This report is a historical cycle study and does not constitute any investment operation statement (no direction recommendations, no point predictions, and no return commitments).

Source: Timemachine run log (run_log.md / connector_log.md) · as of 2026-07-11 · the complete gap register; nothing silently spliced

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Bu istemle başlayın

Konteyner, kuru yük ve tanker döngülerini birbirinden ayıran; sipariş defteri/filo oranlarını en başta sunan ve her rakamın arkasında tarihli kaynaklar bulunan kaydırma tabanlı bir anlatı.

Çince bir sürüm oluşturun

Aynı yapı ve verilerle, doğal Çince bir kaydırma tabanlı anlatı olarak oluşturuldu.

Deep Research'ü deneyin

Oluşturun İngilizce kaydırma tabanlı araştırma sayfası 'Shipping Is Not One Cycle'. Yüklenen shipping-cycle XLSX dosyasından konteyner gemilerini, kuru yük gemilerini ve petrol tankerlerini ayrı ayrı analiz edin: açılış bölümünde üç sipariş defteri/filo oranını yan yana gösterin (konteyner %1,7, kuru yük %0,3, tanker %0,6) ve deniz taşımacılığını tek bir döngü olarak ele almanın neden yanlış bir stratejiye yol açtığını açıklayın; ardından her gemi türü için, tarihleri ve kaynaklarıyla en güncel SCFI ve BDI değerlerine atıf yaparak döngü haritasındaki konumunu sunan bir bölüm ekleyin. Kaydırmayla ilerleyen, kaydırdıkça değişen sabit grafikler içeren, her temel rakamın kaynağına genişletilebildiği, çevrimdışı çalışan tek ve bağımsız bir HTML dosyası olarak dergi kalitesinde İngilizce veri anlatımı oluşturun.

Ham petrol döngülerine geç

Kaydırma tabanlı anlatı biçimini koruyun, ancak üç gemi türü yerine Brent, WTI ve OPEC boş kapasitesini analiz edin.

Deep Research'ü deneyin

İngilizce, kaydırma tabanlı bir araştırma sayfası oluşturun: 'Deniz Taşımacılığı Tek Bir Döngü Değildir'. Yüklenen shipping-cycle XLSX dosyasından, konteyner gemilerini, kuru yük gemilerini, ve petrol tankerleri ayrı ayrı: açılış bölümü üç sipariş defteri-filo oranını yan yana (konteyner %1,7, kuru yük %0,3, tanker %0,6) ve deniz taşımacılığını tek bir döngü olarak ele almanın neden yanlış bir stratejiye yol açtığını açıklayın; ardından her gemi türü için, döngü haritasındaki konumunu sunan ve en güncel SCFI ve BDI değerlerine tarihleri ve kaynaklarıyla atıf yapan bir bölüm ekleyin. Kaydırmayla ilerleyen, kaydırdıkça değişen sabit grafikler içeren, her temel rakamın kaynağına genişletilebildiği, çevrimdışı çalışan tek ve bağımsız bir HTML dosyası olarak dergi kalitesinde İngilizce veri anlatımı oluşturun.

Gemi karşılaştırma aracı ekleyin

Herhangi iki gemi eğrisini fırça aralığı ve metrik seçiciyle üst üste getirebileceğiniz etkileşimli bir modül ekleyin.

Deep Research'ü deneyin

Yüklenen denizcilik döngüsü XLSX dosyasından konteyner gemilerini, kuru yük gemilerini ve petrol tankerlerini ayrı ayrı analiz eden, İngilizce bir kaydırmalı anlatı araştırma sayfası olan 'Shipping Is Not One Cycle'ı oluşturun. Açılış bölümünde üç sipariş defteri-filo oranı yan yana yer alsın (konteyner %1,7, kuru yük %0,3, tanker %0,6) ve denizciliği tek bir döngü olarak ele almanın neden yanlış stratejiye yol açtığı açıklansın; ardından her gemi türü için döngü haritasındaki konumunu veren, en güncel SCFI ve BDI değerlerini tarihleri ve kaynaklarıyla belirten bir bölüm yer alsın. Kaydırmaya dayalı, dergi kalitesinde İngilizce veri anlatımı; kaydırdıkça değişen sabit grafikler; her temel rakamın kaynağına genişletilebildiği; çevrimdışı çalışan, tek ve kendi kendine yeterli HTML dosyası.