海運は一つのサイクルではない
コンテナ船、ばら積み船、タンカーの受注残高対船隊比率はそれぞれ1.7%、0.3%、0.6%。各船種について、日付付きのSCFIおよびBDIの値に基づく独自の判断を示します。
A scrollytelling essay on three freight markets
Shipping Is Not One Cycle
Alongside the container-shipping narrative — where are dry bulk and tanker shipping in their respective cycles?
Data through 2026-07-10 · anchor company: COSCO Shipping Holdings · every figure sourced on the page
- 38.7% — Container orderbook, % of fleet (2026-06)
- 7.0% — Dry-bulk orderbook, % of fleet (2026-06)
- 14.7% — Tanker orderbook, % of fleet (2025-09)
SCROLL▼
One industry, three clocks
No historical period explains all three subsectors at once: the container-shipping orderbook resembles 2007, dry bulk resembles the post-2016 period, and tankers are a new regime that emerged in 2022—the answer must be segmented by vessel type.
Same case: If the delivery wave coincides with the end of rerouting, container shipping enters a 2009–2016-style shakeout.
Different case: The dry bulk/tanker shipping orderbook is thin, and the prosperity is not determined by the container shipping clock.
Container shipping
Event-driven tightness (front-loaded orderbook)
SCFI 3,184.83
On the eve of margin pressure — Premium persists; delivery wave has not yet arrived. Event-driven tightness overlays a 38–39% orderbook with deliveries peaking in 2029.
Shanghai Shipping Exchange / Alphaliner, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: SCFI 3184 / CCFI 1873
Dry bulk
Early upcycle (tentative)
BDI 2,944
Early upcycle / renewed expansion — BDI +101%, earnings at a new high. A ~7% orderbook (multi-year low) meets rerouting-driven ton-miles.
akshare daily / Clarksons via Benzinga, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: BDI 2944(+101%)
Tanker shipping
Renewed expansion (tentative)
BDTI 2,031
Renewed expansion — earnings at a 19-month high and 2025 profits at a record; scrapping near zero while the fleet ages.
akshare daily / Riviera-Clarksons, as of 2026-07-10 · same-date rate: BDTI 2031 / BCTI 1048
Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI/CCFI website (2026-07-10)
+1 more sources
· as of 2026-07-10 · answer box v2
Nineteen years of the anchor company: one listing at the peak, one near-death escape, and two event-driven windfalls
COSCO Shipping Holdings' share-price curve is a living chronology of the container-shipping cycle: listing at the 2007 peak, *ST designation in 2013, and two event-driven windfalls in 2021 and 2024/2026.
IPO price RMB 8.48 in 2007-06, reaching RMB 68.4 in month 10: the cycle peak was the ideal issuance window
Reorganization and name change from *ST in 2013 to 2016: The shakeout left its mark on both the share price and the financial statements
RMB 1.33 from the end of 2020 to ten times in 2021: leading freight rate, mid-range stock price, and trailing profit
01 / 07
Nineteen years in one line
The full forward-adjusted monthly curve, 2007-06 to 2026-07: one listing at the peak, one near-death escape, two event-driven windfalls. All 225 months are plotted; nothing is smoothed away.
02 / 07
2007 — listing at the peak
2007-06-26 Listed: Issue price RMB 8.48, first day opening RMB 15.52 - The peak of the cycle is the best issuance window In 2007-10, the nominal price reached RMB 68.4 (forward-adjusted monthly line 23.57); the BDI collapse began two months later
03 / 07
2013 — the *ST designation
2011/2012 net profit attributable to shareholders of the parent -104.49 / -95.59 × RMB 100 million, renamed on 2013-03-29 *ST Sino-Ocean
04 / 07
2016 — restructuring for survival
2016-02 merged with China Shipping container shipping and divested dry bulk; 2016 full year -99.06 × RMB 100 million is the cost of restructuring; BDI 2016-02-10 saw a record low of 290
05 / 07
2020 — CNY 1.33 on the eve of the pandemic
2020-05 forward-adjusted monthly RMB 1.33: the lowest area in 19 years (the monthly lowest was 1.14 in 2013-07)
06 / 07
2021 — the tenfold rally
SCFI peak of 5109.60 in 2022-01; COSCO Shipping Holdings 2021/2022 profit attributable to shareholders of CNY 89.296 / 109.595 billion (892.96 / 1095.95 × CNY 100 million)
07 / 07
2024 / 2026 — two event-driven windfalls
The Red Sea crisis started in 2023-12, and SCFI peaked at 3733.8 in 2024-07-05. 2026-02-28 The United States and Israel attacked Iran, and Hormuz was closed in March: the two corridors were blocked at the same time for the first time; SCFI 2026-07-10 reported 3184.83
Source: AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)
+1 more sources
· as of 2026-07-10 · akshare stock_zh_a_daily(adjust=qfq) daily resampled to month-end OHLCV; CNY; forward-adjusted
Three freight markets, three curves: since 1988, divergence has been far more common than synchronization
SCFI/CCFI (container shipping), BDI (dry bulk), and BDTI (tankers) must be charted separately under their own definitions: they occasionally move in the same direction but never converge into one cycle.
The three peak peaks of container shipping (2022-01, 2024-07, 2026-07) are all event peaks, and there is no demand peak after order digestion.
BDI observations at 11793/663/290/5650 do not track the container-shipping cycle
The continuous weekly CCFI series is not available in machine-readable form; this report uses only verifiable disclosed observations
01 / 07
Three methodologies, three panels
Container rates are disclosed points (SCFI circles, CCFI squares) — never connected or interpolated. BDI and BDTI are continuous monthly means. The charts are deliberately not spliced together.
02 / 07
1988–2002: the gap is the evidence
In the era of shipping-conference pricing, container shipping rates are not machine-readable or splicable—this page makes the gap explicit. CCFI was first launched on 1998-04-13; it was previously shipping-conference pricing (USITC file)
03 / 07
2003–2008: genuine boom, borrowed orders
China's WTO accession generated real demand, but credit created the 56–68% orderbook; BDI fell from 11793 to 663 in just seven months.
04 / 07
2009–2016: eight years of clearing
At the floor of BDI 290 and CCFI 632.36, China COSCO earned an *ST designation after two consecutive loss-making years, while Hanjin disappeared outright—capacity exit occurred in three forms.
05 / 07
2017–2019: a fragile recovery
The rebound after clearing was narrow and brittle: BDI one-year amplitude 595 → 2518, and the rush to ship in 2018 proved that what looks like demand may not be demand.
06 / 07
2020–2022: the same pandemic, three fates
In the same year that SCFI rose from about 1000 to 5109.6, tankers posted five consecutive loss-making quarters and dry bulk did not catch up until 2021—the textbook answer to why 'shipping is not one cycle.'
07 / 07
2023–2026: three clocks again
SCFI 3,184.83, BDI 2,944 (+101% YoY), BDTI 2,031 — one event, three supply positions, as of 2026-07-10.
Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)
+4 more sources
- FreightAmigo: SCFI historical trend (2026-04-16: 1890.77)
- FreightAmigo: SCFI peak of 5109.60 in 2022-01
- Caixin topic page: 2024-07-05 SCFI 3733.80
- AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988 on; tanker 2001 on)
· as of 2026-07-10 · disclosed points only; no interpolation
Meet the old table first: half of the 2008 players are no longer in the game
The survivors of the previous cycle were selected through bankruptcy, restructuring, and M&A—before reading the old cycle, identify who subsequently disappeared.
Container shipping reduced its workforce through mergers and acquisitions (Hanjin went bankrupt, APL/OOCL/Hamburg Süd was acquired)
Dry bulk relies on restructuring (Genco) and divestiture (China COSCO Holdings bulk cargo)
Tankers relied on Chapter 11 (OSG) and recent consolidation (CMB.TECH)
Container · 13 seats
Maersk
MSC
CMA CGM
China COSCO (container shipping)
China Shipping Container Lines
Hanjin Shipping HanjinBankrupt / exited
APL(NOL)
Evergreen Marine
Hapag-Lloyd
ZIM
Hamburg Süd
OOCL
HMM (Hyundai Merchant Marine)
Dry bulk · 8 seats
China COSCO (dry bulk)
DryShipsBankrupt / exited
Genco
Eagle Bulk
Diana
Golden Ocean
Star Bulk
China Merchants Energy Shipping (dry bulk)
Tanker · 5 seats
Frontline
OSG
Teekay
Euronav
China Merchants Energy Shipping (tankers)
01 / 04
The full 2008 table
Thirteen container lines, eight dry-bulk owners, five tanker players — everyone who held chips when BDI printed five digits.
02 / 04
Bankruptcy and restructuring
Hanjin filed for court receivership on 2016-08-31 and was declared bankrupt on 2017-02-17 — the largest container-shipping bankruptcy in more than 50 years. DryShips burned through repeated reverse splits; Genco and OSG survived through Chapter 11.
03 / 04
Mergers and rescues
APL, OOCL and Hamburg Süd were acquired; China Shipping Container Lines merged into COSCO; HMM survived on state support; Eagle Bulk folded into Star Bulk; Golden Ocean into CMB.TECH.
04 / 04
The 2026 seating chart
Survivors, the renamed and the restructured keep their seats — roughly half the table. Everything else is a tombstone or a subsidiary.
Source: Seatrade, 2017-02-17: Hanjin declared bankrupt
+6 more sources
- Korea Herald, 2025-12-11: HMM sale process restarts
- Eastmoney 2013-03-28: China COSCO Holdings changed its name to *ST Ocean
- Caixin Weekly 2022-11-05 "COSCO Prepares for a New Cycle"
- Star Bulk announcement, 2024-04-09: completed absorption of Eagle Bulk
- CMB.TECH announcement, 2025-08-20: completed absorption of Golden Ocean
- breakbulk, 2026-04-10: Hapag to acquire ZIM for USD 4.2 billion (42 × USD 100 million)
· as of 2026-07-11 · fates cross-checked with the extinction and consolidation ledger
Losses hit the financial statements quarter by quarter: capacity exit in the 2011–2016 quarterly income statements
Breaking the annual reports' 'two years of massive losses' into quarters reveals six years of persistently negative margins punctuated by several asset-sale spikes.
2011–2016 clearing · 2020–2022 boom · 2024–2026 current
Six years of persistently negative margins: the positive pulses in 2014–2015 came from asset-sale quarters; earnings excluding non-recurring items stayed negative (-14 / -46 x CNY 100 million). Quarterly values are derived by differencing cumulative statements.
Source: AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)
+1 more sources
· as of 2026-07-10 · quarterly = cumulative-statement difference (derived)
Proportion of orderbook to fleet: 2007–2008 leverage, only half returned in 2026
In 2007, container shipping orderbook 56% and dry bulk 67.6% in 2008 were "borrowed prosperity"; in 2026, container shipping 38-39% has returned to the same magnitude range, while dry bulk 7% is a historically unusual restraint.
One isometric layer equals five percentage points of the active fleet. Fractional top layers are preserved; missing disclosures stay missing.
Source: Hapag-Lloyd prospectus: 2007 orderbook ≈56% of fleet
+3 more sources
- Notteboom/VLIZ: 2008-07 orderbook, dry bulk 67.6% / containers 53.2%
- Costamare 20-F: orderbook 8.4% (2020-10) →23.1% (2021-12)
- SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%
· as of 2026-07-10 · TEU for container; dwt for dry bulk and tanker
Freight rates lead earnings by one to four quarters: two lead-lag comparisons
Container shipping lags behind by 1-4 quarters due to long-term contract buffering, and tanker shipping lags by 1-2 quarters due to spot direct delivery - people who read freight rates always arrive earlier than people who read income statements.
container shipping: CCFI disclosure point vs COSCO Shipping Holdingsquarterly net profit margin, 2020Q1→2026Q1
Tanker shipping: quarterly average BDTI vs. China Merchants Energy Shipping quarterly net margin, using continuous series for close analysis
CCFI consists of disclosed observations rather than a continuous series; read the two charts vertically without mixing their axes
Container: CCFI disclosed points vs. COSCO quarterly attributable margin (shift up to 4 quarters)
Play the lagShifted right by 0 quarters■ COSCO attributable margin (left) — CCFI (right)
Tanker: quarterly mean BDTI vs. CMES quarterly net margin (shift up to 2 quarters)
Play the lagShifted right by 0 quarters■ CMES net margin (left) — BDTI quarterly mean (right)
Source: SSE (via Sina): 2022-01 CCFI monthly average 3510.83
+3 more sources
- SIMIC 2025 review: CCFI annual average 1197.60
- Shanghai Shipping Exchange CCFI website (2026-07-10: 1873.15)
- AkShare: forward-adjusted A-share daily prices and income statements (upstream source: sina)
· as of 2026-07-10 · read the two charts vertically; axes are independent
Five-window scorecard: which historical period most resembles today, and which least resembles it
The outlook for container shipping is most like the beginning of 2009-2016 (an overhanging orderbook), the outlook for dry bulk is least like any history of excess, and the outlook for tankers is a new chapter of 2022.
1988–2002
Containerization penetration
Shipping-conference pricing collapses and container shipping index is absent
Freight rates: Container shipping is not available (BDI background) · Orderbook: No publicly available definition
NEGATIVE CONTROL
2003–2008
demand_pull
China's WTO-accession demand boom + orderbook leverage
Freight rates: BDI 11793→663 · Orderbook: Set 56% / Dry 67.6%
MIXED
2009–2016
oversupply
Delivery Flood + Eight Years Clearance of Demand Collapse
Freight rates: BDI 290; CCFI 632.36 · Orderbook: Peak -43%
SAME SCRIPT
2017–2019
policy
Fragile recovery after clearing + policy costs
Freight rates: BDI 595–2518 · Orderbook: low position
DIFFERENT
2020–2022
logistics_disruption + demand
Pandemic-driven goods-for-services substitution + congestion
Freight rates: SCFI 5109.60; BDTI 2020 peak→2021 trough · Orderbook: 8.4%→23.1%
EVENT SAMPLE
Rejected: 1973–1986 tanker boom—Great Depression
Why it is tempting: Geopolitical shock → skyrocketing freight rates → excess orders → long depression, similar to the narrative of Hormuz
Why excluded: Predates the main window beginning in 1988; no container liner market existed then; freight-rate definitions cannot be spliced onto the index era (mechanism mismatch + data not comparable)
Rejected: “2021 dry bulk spike and container shipping are in the same big cycle”
Why it is tempting: BDI 5650 and SCFI 5109.6 peaked in the same year in 2021, with similar curve shapes
Why excluded: Different drivers: dry bulk = coal/ore restocking + congestion; container shipping = goods-for-services substitution + port congestion; moving in the same direction in the same year ≠ the same cycle (negative_control retained)
Rule preserved: shape similarity is not mechanism identity. Two curves peaking in the same year does not make them the same cycle.
Source: FAO Food Outlook 2008: Ocean freight(IGC)
+4 more sources
- AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988→; tankers 2001→2026-07)
- Hapag-Lloyd prospectus: 2007 orderbook ≈56% of fleet
- UNCTAD RMT 2012: orderbook -43% from the 2008 peak
- Costamare 20-F: orderbook 8.4% (2020-10) →23.1% (2021-12)
· as of 2026-07-11 · shape similarity is not mechanism identity
What can and cannot transmit across subsectors
Capital and sentiment can transmit across segments (orders, vessel prices, risk pricing); demand and measurement conventions cannot (cargo types, contracts, index definitions).
Stock price 2020=100 Rebase: Seven types of shipowners trace seven distinct paths, and divergence was priced in early
Orderbook and ship age are subsector-specific variables and cannot be extrapolated across subsectors.
BDI does not substitute for container freight rates, and tanker earnings cannot be extrapolated to container-shipping profit
Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)
+3 more sources
- AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988→; tankers 2001→2026-07)
- SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%
- Riviera/Clarksons, 2025-11-10: tanker earnings at a 19-month high; orderbook at 14.7%
· as of 2026-07-10 · prohibitions from the same-date comparison table
Three industries now
But the orderbook structure is completely different: 38–39% for containers (delivery peak in 2029), about 7% for dry bulk (multi-year low), and about 15% for tankers (rising from lows). Under the same wave of geopolitical price sensitivity, the three supply curves point to three different outlooks.
Container shipping currently = event tension covers the eve of the delivery peak (more like the supply side at the end of 2007, not like the demand side in 2003-2006); dry bulk = early upswing with event-driven windfalls superimposed on a thin supply cushion; tanker shipping = sanctions and detours prolong the latter part of the boom but orders begin to pick up. The stage signals of the three sub-sectors cannot be applied to each other.
Container shipping
▼ We are here now
Freight-rate normalization
Event-driven tightness
Delivery for peak digestion
Rebalancing supply and demand
2025From 2026-022027–2029 (forward)Undetermined
3,184.83
SCFI composite (2026-07-10)
Shanghai Shipping Exchange
1,873.15
CCFI composite (2026-07-10)
Shanghai Shipping Exchange
38.3–39%
orderbook as share of fleet; delivery peak 2029
Alphaliner / SAFETY4SEA, 2026-06-24
-86%
Suez Canal container transits vs. 2023
same-date comparison, 2026-07-10
SCFI 3184.83 is an event-driven rate, not a demand-driven rate; the real variable is whether the 2027–2029 delivery wave or the resumption of normal routing comes first.
Dry bulk
▼ We are here now
bottom observation
Early upcycle
Renewed expansion
overheating
2023–2024 LowFrom 2025To be confirmed on demandUndetermined
2,944
BDI (2026-07-10, +101% YoY)
akshare daily
~7%
orderbook as share of fleet (multi-year low)
Clarksons via Benzinga, 2026-02-16
3,620 x 10,000 dwt
2025 deliveries; ordering stays restrained
SBLK call / Clarksons
BCI > BPI
large vessels capture the gains; not broad-based
akshare monthly means
BDI +101% YoY looks like a major cycle, but decomposes into a 7% orderbook + rerouting-driven ton-miles + a Hormuz premium—an early upcycle in which demand is only part of the driver mix.
Tanker shipping
▼ We are here now
Margin pressure
Early recovery
Upcycle
Overheating/reversal
Five consecutive quarters of losses in 20212022 Rosneft RestructuringFrom 2023Pending orders and scrapping votes
2,031 / 1,048
BDTI / BCTI (2026-07-10)
akshare daily
14.7%
orderbook as share of fleet (up from 7%)
Riviera / Clarksons, 2025-11-10
USD 559.1M
Frontline 2026Q1 net profit — one Hormuz quarter
yfinance quarterly statement
~0
tanker scrapping (36 vessels in 9M 2025)
Riviera / Clarksons, 2025-11
Earnings reached a 19-month high and profits set records—tankers have delivered the strongest earnings realization of the three subsectors; the open questions are a 14.7% orderbook and zero scrapping.
Source: Shanghai Shipping Exchange SCFI website (2026-07-10: 3184.83)
+3 more sources
- AkShare: Baltic indices daily (BDI 1988→; tankers 2001→2026-07)
- SAFETY4SEA/Alphaliner, 2026-06-24: orderbook at 38.3%
- Riviera/Clarksons, 2025-11-10: tanker earnings at a 19-month high; orderbook at 14.7%
· as of 2026-07-10 · stages tentative; metric cards carry their own citations
What to watch next: confirmation and invalidation checklist for the three subsectors
Every signal includes a threshold, source, and invalidation point—shipping is not one cycle, so it cannot be monitored on a single shared dashboard.
container shipping: traffic recovery vs orderbook delivery, who comes first?
Dry bulk: can BDI remain above 1500 without triggering new orders?
Tanker shipping: pace of earnings normalization vs. when scrapping accelerates
Suez/Hormuz transit volumeEVENT
Current value
Suez approximately -60% vs. 2023 (first week of 2026, BIMCO)
Threshold
Recovery to over 90% by 2023
Expected lag
Freight rates lag transit volumes by 2-6 weeks
Falsifier
A prolonged low-rate regime becomes the new normal, resetting the freight-rate floor
Status: missing · BIMCO via gol.ua/indiaseatradenews · 2026-03-20
container shipping freight SCFI/CCFIPRICE
Current value
SCFI 3184.83 / CCFI 1873.15(2026-07-10)
Threshold
Back to 2019 Hub (CCFI<900) = Event Premium Clearing
Expected lag
Leads earnings by 1-4 quarters
Falsifier
Freight rates remain elevated after rerouting ends, with cargo volumes providing confirmation
Status: partial · Shanghai Shipping Exchange website · 2026-07-10
container-shipping orderbook deliveriesCAPACITY
Current value
38.3–39% (1298–1328 × 10,000 TEU)
Threshold
2027–2029 Delivery vs Cancellation Rate; Delivery Peak 2029
Expected lag
Freight price will be lowered 1-2 quarters after delivery
Falsifier
Mass cancellation/postponement of orders
Status: met · Alphaliner/Linerlytica 2026-06 · 2026-06-24
dry bulk BDIPRICE
Current value
2944 (2026-07-10, +101% year-on-year)
Threshold
Fall back below 1500 and stay = end of uptrend
Expected lag
Leads carrier earnings by 1-2 quarters
Falsifier
Iron ore/coal cargo volumes invalidate the ton-mile thesis
Status: partial · akshare daily · 2026-07-10
dry-bulk orderbookCAPACITY
Current value
Approximately 7% (multi-year low)
Threshold
Rises to 15%+ = supply discipline breaks down
Expected lag
Delivery 2-3 years after ordering
Falsifier
Dry-bulk ordering wave
Status: met · Clarksons via Benzinga/FINVIZ · 2026-02-16
Tanker earnings/orderbookPRICE
Current value
Weighted income is nearly 5 × USD 10,000/day (2025-10); orderbook 14.7%
Threshold
Earnings fall back to the ten-year average (about 2.5 × 10,000/day, or 25,000/day) or the orderbook continues to rise
Expected lag
Earnings flow directly into current-period profit
Falsifier
Sanctions ease + higher OPEC output pressures rates
Status: partial · Riviera/Clarksons 2025-11 · 2025-11-10
Tanker scrappingCAPACITY
Current value
Scrapping was nearly zero (only 36 vessels in the first 9 months of 2025)
Threshold
Surge in scrapping of older vessels (>20 years) = confirmation of the late-cycle phase
Expected lag
Coincident with or slightly after the freight-rate peak
Falsifier
The dark fleet will absorb old ships and the compliant fleet will not be dismantled
Status: missing · Riviera/Clarksons 2025-11 · 2025-11-10
Anchor-company quarterly net marginFINANCIALS
Current value
2026Q1 11.35% (COSCO Shipping Holdings)
Threshold
Two consecutive quarters of sequential improvement = event impact has reached earnings
Expected lag
Lags freight rates by 1-4 quarters
Falsifier
Profit margin falls back to the 2019 level (<5%)
Status: partial · sina/iFinD income-statement differencing · 2026-04-30
Source: Monitoring checklist: thresholds, sources, and falsifiers as registered in the analysis workbook · as of 2026-07-10 · eight signals across price, capacity, event, and financials
Definitions, gaps, and disclaimers: what this report cannot answer
All known gaps are disclosed; the two most important are the unavailable continuous CCFI series and the lack of verifiable container freight rates before 2003.
| Gap | Scope of impact | Processing method |
|---|---|---|
| The continuous weekly CCFI/SCFI series is not available in machine-readable form | Long chart of container shipping rates (p04/p12/p15) | Official/authoritative disclosure of key time point values + legend stating that it is non-continuous and does not interpolate |
| There is no public index for container shipping rates from 1988–2002 | W0 window (p05) | Structural gap page + retrieval ladder; BDI is background only, not a substitute |
| iFinD monthly history begins in 2019 | Anchor-company share price, 2007–2018 (p03) | akshare substitute (upstream source: sina), with definitions labeled in separate columns |
| Yahoo ^BDIY unavailable / GOGL only 2 rows | dry bulk index and peer (p04/p14) | akshare substitute; GOGL marked as delisted in the ledger |
| No cross-market FX conversion | rebased chart (p14) | Priced in local currency, only comparing relative forms |
| Image-generation capability unavailable | 2 explainer bits (p01/p02) | Visible gap + structured diagram on the same page (pre-authorized by the user) |
Known limitations
- The continuous weekly CCFI/SCFI series is not available in machine-readable form (Shanghai Shipping Exchange subscription); the container freight-rate chart uses only official/authoritative observations at key dates, is non-continuous, and does not interpolate between observations.
- From 1988 to 2002, container shipping was in the era of shipping-conference pricing, and there was no public unified freight index; the container shipping freight rate in this window was a structural gap, and the BDI was only used as a background and did not replace the history of container shipping.
- iFinD get_price monthly history begins around 2019 (earlier queries return EMPTY_DATA); the 2007–2018 monthly series for 601919 uses akshare instead (upstream source: sina; forward-adjusted), with the two definitions shown in separate columns.
- yfinance ^BDIY is unavailable (404); BDI/BCI/BPI/BCTI/BDTI now use akshare. After GOGL merged into CMB.TECH in 2025-08, Yahoo retained only 2 rows; the dry-bulk peer set now uses SBLK and 601872.
- The cross-market rebased chart is denominated in local currencies (auto-adjust); no FX conversion is applied, and only relative patterns are compared.
- Quarterly data for COSCO Shipping Holdings/China Merchants Energy Shipping are derived by differencing cumulative statements (derived); 2016 includes non-recurring restructuring items, while 2014–2015 profit attributable to shareholders includes spikes from asset sales.
- China Merchants Energy Shipping is a diversified operator (tankers/dry bulk/LNG/ro-ro); its margin is not a pure-play tanker metric.
- Because image generation is unavailable in this session, two generated-explainer slots are replaced, under the user's prior authorization, with visible gaps + structured diagrams on the same page (not_evidence=true).
- The Hormuz/Red Sea incident from February to July 2026 is still evolving; freight rates and traffic volumes are as of 2026-07-10.
Report title: Global shipping is not one cycle: alongside the container-shipping narrative, where are dry bulk and tanker shipping in their respective cycles?
Source pack: Data source file: 0710-vibe-global shipping (timemachine_report.json / charts.json; data through 2026-07-10)
Run id: not recorded in the source pack
Data through: 2026-07-10
Method reference: scrollytelling essay conventions popularized by The Pudding (see NOTES-pudding.md).
Disclaimer: This report is a historical cycle study and does not constitute any investment operation statement (no direction recommendations, no point predictions, and no return commitments).
Source: Timemachine run log (run_log.md / connector_log.md) · as of 2026-07-11 · the complete gap register; nothing silently spliced
コンテナ、ばら積み、タンカーのサイクルを分けて解説するスクロール型エッセイ。冒頭に受注残高対船隊比率を示し、すべての数値に日付付きの出典を添えています。
以下を英語でスクロール型リサーチページ「Shipping Is Not One Cycle」として作成してください。アップロードされたshipping-cycle XLSXをもとに、コンテナ船、ばら積み貨物船、石油タンカーをそれぞれ分析します。ヒーローセクションでは、3つの受注残高対船隊比率（コンテナ1.7%、ばら積み0.3%、タンカー0.6%）を横並びで示し、海運を一つのサイクルとして扱うと誤った戦略につながる理由を説明してください。続いて、船種ごとにサイクルマップ上の位置を示すセクションを設け、最新のSCFIおよびBDIの値を日付と出典付きで引用します。雑誌品質の英語によるデータストーリーテリングとして、スクロールを軸に構成し、スクロールに合わせて切り替わる固定チャートを使用してください。すべての主要な数値は出典を展開して確認できるようにし、オフラインで動作する単一の自己完結型HTMLファイルにしてください。
英語のスクロール型リサーチページ「海運「一つのサイクルではない」。アップロードされたshipping-cycle XLSXから、コンテナ船、ばら積み船、および石油タンカーをそれぞれ分析します。ヒーローセクションでは、3つの受注残高対船隊比率」を作成してください。ヒーローセクションでは、コンテナ1.7%、ばら積み0.3%、タンカー0.6%を横並びで示し、海運を一つのサイクルとして扱うと誤った戦略につながる理由を説明してください。続いて、各船種は、最新のSCFIとBDIの値を日付と出典付きで引用し、サイクルマップ上での位置を示します。スクロールに連動する雑誌品質の英語データストーリーテリング。スクロールに合わせて切り替わる固定チャート、出典まで展開できるすべての主要数値、オフラインで動作する単一の自己完結型HTMLファイル。
英語のスクロール連動型リサーチページ「海運は一つのサイクルではない」を作成してください。アップロードされたshipping-cycle XLSXから、コンテナ船、ばら積み船、石油タンカーをそれぞれ分析します。ヒーローセクションでは、3つの受注残高対船隊比率（コンテナ船1.7%、ばら積み船0.3%、タンカー0.6%）を並べて示し、海運を一つのサイクルとして扱うと誤った戦略につながる理由を説明してください。続いて船種ごとにセクションを設け、日付と出典を添えた最新のSCFIおよびBDIの値を引用して、サイクルマップ上での位置を示します。スクロールに連動する雑誌品質の英語データストーリーテリング、スクロールに合わせて切り替わる固定チャート、出典まで展開できるすべての主要数値、オフラインで動作する単一の自己完結型HTMLファイル.
9つの研究グループと21,285本の共引用エッジを回転可能なマップに表示。研究グループ、年、ジャーナルで色分けし、ノードをクリックすると著者、被引用数、最も近い近隣ノードを確認できます。
中国国家博物館所蔵青銅器の資料。記録済みの銘文字形のみを扱い、子龍と子龔の読解を並べて比較し、年代比定マトリクスと来歴の空白を示します。